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A common interpretation of Plato's theory of human reality is to equate it with the soul. For some, there was a question as to whether Plotius adhered to his master's position on the issue. H. J. Blumenthal initiated many discussions when he asked, Did Plotius believe in the ideas of individuals? (1) Supported by the apparently contradictory texts Blumenthal came to the conclusion that Plotius really believed from time to time in such ideas, and at other times not. One way that commentators take in such cases is to point out that inconsistency is a sign of great thinkers. Hilary Armstrong didn't do that. (2) He reconciled the obvious contradictions by using new punctuation for the most decisive text against individual forms for man. Passages are often accepted as contradictions applied to completely different realities. Position Dam should be taken from the lines of Ennead V.7, 1 18-23: No, there can be the same principle of formation for different people, and one person will not serve as a model for several men, differing from each other not only because of their matter, but also with a huge number of special differences of form. Men are not related to their shape, as Socrates portraits are their original, but their different structures must be the result of different principles of formation. As Armstrong points out, the higher me dam is not just identical to the individual form of a particular person. The Higher Self, which The Dams interprets as intelligence or nous that does not descend, nevertheless counts as a soul. In Ennead V.3, people are described as the reasoning of the soul, wandering between incarnation and intellect. But people can transcend their reasoning of the soul and identify with one's higher soul or intellect, and even overcome it to come to an alliance with One incomprehensible Self-Consciousness, to which, according to J.P. O'Daly, (3) it is called by the love given by the Good, which is that there is a Personality. The constituent man, that is, man as the embodied rational soul, is rightly represented by its highest me or me as a self-governing principle of the totality of mankind. Damus clearly sees man as derived from one first principle, through form-intelligence and all-soul. In that sense, he's not a dualist. But he recognizes material components in any family and environment as contributing distinguishing features to individuals. But he also recognizes the free me or higher soul, which chooses how material circumstances will be used to achieve the human goal, can be made possible by the union of truth and love. It is not appropriate to put another Ego called Armstrong's empirical self. If, as he says, and I think it is right that Plotinus speaks only of a different attitude to what has the greatest value in human capabilities for action, then one needs only one me or above self that exercises in the empirical world, and against his own into a transcendental world where transcendent means the realm of truth, goodness, beauty, is different from, but not separated from, the intelligent world. Indeed, Damus said that the world of feelings is in one place, but the clear world is everywhere. (4) Thus, self-realization is an alliance with the Good, to whom the higher powers of knowledge and love for open people. The human self is the possessed spirit with a call to bring the human spirit to its true fulfillment. In alliance with the Good, the focus expands to include the benefit of all, not that of one's particular personality. Man, whatever he may be, avoids the narrowness of his own worries to take a worldview that is universal and providential. This is the only profitable way for a person to participate in universality. The dam should be congratulated on the fact that it is not left only with the universal forms of Plato's man higher than that of individuals. There can be no friendship between universal forms, as it can be between specific people. To abandon the high value of friendship would be a disaster, in its scrb for as much understanding of God as humans can achieve by human mind working in the light of faith, Augustine developed philosophical anthropology. (5) He thought that taking his religion seriously was to seek to understand it. And this entails a certain degree of self-knowledge. He came to the conclusion that if humans are made only in the image and likeness of God, then this image should be found in what distinguishes them from animals. Therefore, he looked at the rational soul and the higher part of the soul as the nearest to God, namely the people, the mind. For man, this is what he is, Augustine taught, primarily because of his spiritual substance. Recognizing that openness to the divine lies in the intellectual activity of cognition and readiness, Augustine spoke of men as the spiritual eye of the soul. By assigning him the power of self-knowledge and self-determination, he gave reason the role of a personal leader in the face of the grammatical pronoun I, without equating the mind or soul with the human person. For him, the human spirit permeates all parts of the body and can orient them to the spiritual destiny of man. Referring to the mind as me or presence itself, it included memory, intelligence, and will. Because a person is never crazy and yet does not always think about himself, there is a memory of himself. The mind acts and speaks in the name of all human beings, body and rational soul. The inner self-consciousness of the spiritual soul is the reality that every mature person experiences, but it does not entail the definition of a person as consciousness or self-consciousness. It is, one might assume, the power and glory of being human, but not the common reality of the human person. The complete nature of man, Augustine wrote, consists of spirit, soul and body. For Augustine, moreover, I am that remembered and known not only by a substantial person, but by man as a divine image. I is a knowledgeable mind or conscious subject of various spiritual and bodily actions. These spiritual actions distinguish people from non-persons, but the mind is part of the rational soul, present throughout the body, which it has formed. According to Augustine, there is one single reality that thinks and which animates the body and is the principle of physiological activity. (7) I, as a shy mind, also realize that this is the part representing the whole. Sometimes it was done in Scripture, when the whole person was called soul or body. The whole person can be marked by each of its parts. (8) Augustine was not platonist in his philosophical anthropology. The expression of man has always meant for him a human sub-banning substance. He said that the human soul naturally tends to live in the body, (9) and that whoever wants to separate the body from human nature is a fool. (10) He never offered a metaphysical explanation of how the body and soul are united. He considered their union very mysterious, but thought he was realized in and in mind. Personally, I act with the help of mental parts and bodily parts, but Augustine insists that the self-determination principle acts on behalf of one individual. The unity of all human experiences must be in self-awareness, for what other part of the embodied spirit can be known? Self-reflection is impossible for material realities. Without providing a metaphysical explanation of human unity (e.g., act potency), he nevertheless taught that the physiological principle of life in people is one with the rational principle of life, while it distinguished their roles. (11) Augustine was very aware that according to Scripture God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness, and not let the mind of man to our image and likeness. Having found, like him, an analogy with the inner life of God as divine Processions, he nevertheless considered a man embodied by a soul fully represented by a shy Ego, who defines all personal actions to exist and be whatever they may be. (12) Since the rational soul leads to the human personality, Augustine's personality comes mainly from the human soul, but refers to a man or woman, composed of a rational soul and a human body. This composition of body and soul is personal unity. (13) III The most cited remark by Saint Phoma Aquinas about a man is a statement of his value. He said: Man refers to what is most perfect in all nature, namely what exists in the rational nature. (14) But it became more philosophically final in the following statement: ... we are correctly talking about substances as individuals... Now, the feature and individuality is more especially and perfectly present in the rational who control their actions.... For it is right for individuals or individuals to act. Thus, a special name is given among all other substances to individual beings of a rational nature, and this name is a person... According to some theologians, substance, as it is in the definition of a person, refers to the first substance... However, adding an individual is not unnecessary. For what we eliminate by the word ... The first substance is universal or partial..., but by adding an individual, we eliminate the notion of reality that can be accepted by others. (15) It is common knowledge that, having adopted the Aristotle form-matter as the principles of act-potency, Aquinas held the human body and soul together in close metaphysical unity with one rational form, practically sensitive and vegetative, bringing its spiritual existence into the body. In the tonic view of knowledge there is an echo of the shy me Augustine or Ego (representing a person). As F.D. Wilhelmsen noted, Thomas's ego is just a spiritual or intellectual existence, completely open to itself in its very formation, which is not in itself but as another. (16) St. Thomas discusses this as all the knowledge that comes through the assimilation of the know and the known. (17) Thus, the ego is made up in the act of knowing the other. This makes itself a reflective phase of intelligence..... It's self-reflection becoming a different ego. The act of cognition is open to one's own being, with intellect judging its attitude to reality; such as the intellectual reflection. Thus, the ego is a function of truth, as it is known. Perhaps that's why Aquinas has written so many articles about knowledge and very little, if any, about me, which is of such interest today. To say that there is a substance equal to the ego does not mean denying the substance of the human person. The ego is what I like to know and do: it is, Thomas Aquinas would say, selfness, which is my story. This analysis is rooted in Aquinas's theory of knowledge: that the knowledgeable becomes known; that understandable view is not what is actually understood, but what intelligence understands. There is no representative picture between a known person and a known reality. The court is an act of union with the real; in the judgment of the subject and the predicate means the same in reality. Find an ego or me as an attendant with intellectual activity to check that only human beings, not nature, are subjects or agents of human activity. In this position, Aquinas joins Augustine, who said: I understand that I understand. (18) This is knowledge, knowing one's connection with the real. In conclusion, therefore, according to Ms. Aquinas, ego or self-consciousness, self-consciousness is simply a spiritual activity, taking myself in hand and measuring one's own conformity to the real one. (19) IV Philosopher Karol Ownila, better like John Paul II, took The View of Phoma Aquinas as a essential essence of the rational soul and human body, but also explored human existence from a phenomenological point of view. Thus, he expanded and improved the definition of human boethius as an individual substance of rational nature. Moreover, Ovtyla fully accepts the aristoteal hislomorphism and adaptation of the Aristotle act potency to the existence-essence. However, he believes that the phenomenological method can illuminate some of the ethical facts that are crucial to obtaining a more comprehensive view of the individual. Using this method, he approaches the human experience, not to abstract from its specific conditions. This is, of course, the Merlot-Ponty way. Among such experiences is a universal conscience where we experience our actions as good or evil. Although the justification for such an experience is in a metaphysical manner, where the nature of good is explored, the phenomenological method recreates the toystic position of the mutual connection between the soul and the body within a person. It is in the act of self-determination (20) that Ovtyla finds a personal being as an agent not only of what is being done in the outside world, but also in the fashion and development of a unique personal being. In his lecture at Harvard in 1976, he said, I possess it not so much through self-awareness as through self-determination. Ovtyla's first meeting with Phoma Aquinas as a seminary student was through a book about metaphysics from the perspective of Transcendental Tomism. (21) He told his examiner that the vision he had received from this study was more valuable to him than the good score he had received. It was a testament to his personal experience as a personal experience. Everyone knows that his dissertation on the qualification of a university professor was devoted to shelher's discussion of the objective status of value as an experienced phenomenological. He later rejected much of Scheler's thought, but admits that he used Merlot Ponti's ideas. Ovtyla repeats Aristotle, seeing human dignity not only in rational consciousness with an emphasis on self-determination, but also in virtuous actions. Ovtyla taught that a person's moral experience is an important manifestation of who he or she is. Who the person is becoming and cannot be determined is only described. He said: Man.... is the subject of existence and action that cannot be attributed to rationality. Is the purpose of privacy to be found in nature? asks Ovnila. He replies that human experience reveals a certain transcendental nature of human action. Therefore, he refers to actions as a phenomenon open to general awareness, capable of even more accurate description. This is why he focuses on the acting person, the person as the subject of action, and concludes that the person has a rational character and existence and action. (22) The emphasis on action is consistent with Ovtyla's respect for experience. However, he never thought that phenomenology was enough to interpret even a reasonable experience. For, no matter how undeniable the differences in the functions of feeling and intellect, it should be emphasized that human knowledge is an organic, not just an organizational one. The experience contains not only a sensual, but also an intellectual element. For this reason, we can say that the human experience is already an understanding. The same applies to a person as an object of investigation. The basis for understanding him or her should be sought in the experience. Any human act involves a deliberate, pragmatic and ethical aspect. The experience of any human action is the experience of me that makes action. It's a private matter. It entails the consciousness of being an agent, a personal self, to be solely responsible for action like good or evil. But the act of self-determination for Ovtyla is more than doing: it's becoming. When I decide to move in the direction of a certain value, I decide about myself, whether in this act I become good or evil. In self-determination, the ego or me encounters itself as the object of its action. I open up. In the act of self-determination, a person experiences himself as a person. In self-determined actions aimed at others in their own interests, the acting person becomes more fully self-recoiced as a person, as only people are able to make a selfless gift to others. Karol Ovnila emphasizes more than Aquinas's relational as well as the basic character of the person, as shown in mature acts of self-determination. In conclusion, let us remember that whether me or Ego is born in acts of consciousness or acts of will, whether I am identified with the soul or with the mind, the highest part of the soul, with intellect or will, I nevertheless means a common human being composed by the soul and body, which is ontologically human. Man.

